Rating assessments of microfinance institutions are claimed to measure a combination of creditworthiness, trustworthiness and excellence in microfinance. Using a global dataset covering reports from 324 microfinance institutions, this study suggests that these ratings are mainly driven by size, profitability, and risk. The ratings do not seem to capture the double bottom-line objective of microfinance institutions, as our analyses are unable to prove any statistical relationship between microfinance ratings and the social objectives of these institutions. Moreover, the association between operational efficiency and microfinance ratings appears weak. Although there are some minor differences between the rating agencies, the overall results suggest that microfinance ratings convey information very similar to that communicated by traditional credit ratings. 
Introduction
During the last decade, several firms have specialised in conducting rating assessments of microfinance institutions (MFIs). Established rating agencies like Fitch and Standard and Poor's have also conducted MFI ratings (Fitch 2008) . The purpose of rating reports is to present independent information that stakeholders like lenders, owners or managers can use to make informed decisions. Donors are particularly likely to consider external assessments important and to support the rating of MFIs. The first international rating fund offering cofunding for microfinance ratings was launched in 2001 by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Following the close of this initial fund in 2008, two new initiatives were launched to co-finance and promote the use of ratings and assessments in the microfinance industry (see www.ratinginitiative.org and www.ratingfund2.org). Nevertheless, Hartarska (2005) reports that whether a firm is rated or not has no influence on Eastern European MFI performance. Moreover, Hartarska (2009) finds that only some rating agencies influence the actions of MFIs and that subsidised ratings do not help MFIs to raise more funds (Hartarska & Nadolnyak 2008) . Thus, there is an obvious need for more information about microfinance ratings.
Mixmarket is a webpage (www.mixmarket.org) where MFIs can present their profiles to funders and other industry actors. Mixmarket stresses the importance of transparency and has established a diamond system in which the maximum score of 5 diamonds is only given to those MFIs that present an external rating report that supports the information provided to the MIX. Thus, for most MFIs, and especially for those in need of international funding, external ratings have become a necessity.
The recent financial crisis taught the global community a lesson about ratings. The high ratings for several financial instruments turned out to be inaccurate. Similar lessons can be found in the microfinance industry. For example, Microfinanza awarded the Afghanistan MFI Normicro a BB rating in 2006 and a BBB-rating in 2008. A triple B rating is considered a good rating in the microfinance industry and is considerably above the average, which in our dataset is approximately a B. One result of the good ratings was that several international funds, including the EU Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the US- few months later, Normicro found itself in serious trouble because of severe internal fraud and mismanagement, which investigations confirmed had been going on for years. As a result, the major shareholder, Kolibri Kapital, has lost its whole investment, and the rest of the lenders are currently struggling to keep the MFI afloat and minimise their losses (Annual report Kolibri Kapital 2009, www.kolibrikapital.no) .
In this study, we investigate the drivers of a good MFI rating. As expected, the findings indicate that firm size and profitability are positively related to MFI ratings, whereas there is a negative relationship between ratings and risk. Unexpectedly, we find that both efficiency and solvency are unrelated to the ratings by all but one of the analysed rating agencies.
Furthermore, none of our analyses reveal a statistical relationship between social performance and ratings. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to use multivariate techniques in evaluating the drivers of MFI ratings. We present evidence that prior research that has only used bivariate statistical techniques to a limited degree has yielded hasty conclusions; it fails to recognise the simultaneous influence of correlated explanatory variables. In addition, and contrary to prior research, we investigate the possible influence of solvency on ratings, as this is one of the major explanatory variables for traditional credit ratings. We are also the first to provide evidence of possible differences between the rating agencies. Although some of the rating drivers are common to all of the agencies investigated, significant differences between the agencies do exist.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant prior research on MFI ratings, presents the hypotheses to be tested, and introduces the research design. Section 3 presents the data sample, and Section 4 analyses the results of the empirical studies. In 5 addition to the main tests, we also discuss a large number of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Background, Hypotheses, and Research Design
Public risk rating agencies have been in existence for decades, and names like Standard and Poor's, Fitch and Moody's are well known in business circles. These traditional rating services are exclusively concerned with repayment risk; the ratings signal the likelihood that a specific debt obligation will be paid on time. In principle, any corporation or organisation can be rated, including MFIs, but the number of MFIs with credit ratings is still small (GutierrezNieto and Serrano-Cinka 2007). However, another type of rating is common in the microfinance industry: so-called performance assessment ratings 1 . These ratings should not be confused with traditional credit risk ratings. Whereas such ratings measure the likelihood that a particular public or private debt issue will be re-paid in full and on time, performance assessment ratings measure a combination of creditworthiness, trustworthiness and excellence in microfinance (www.ratinginitiative.org). Thus, performance assessment ratings are supposedly much more extensive than pure credit risk ratings in terms of the information that they provide. Sinha (2002) states that many MFI operations are a "black box" and that this creates questions about their performance. As a result, the need for performance assessments is urgent. (Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2008) . This expectation is supported by Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinka (2010), who find that social performance measures such as outreach affect perceptions of MFI quality, which is an important driver of funder loyalty in their study.
Furthermore, there are also several empirical issues related to how social performance should be measured, and we will return to these issues in the next section.
We begin our empirical study with a correlation analysis similar to that of Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinka (2007) . We then use multivariate analysis to analyse the simultaneous influence of the variables on the ratings. Solvency is excluded from the initial regressions so that the findings can be compared with those of Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinka (2007) .
Thus, the following regression is run on the pooled sample:
(1) ε β β β β β β
where SIZE is MFI size, PROF is a measure of MFI profitability, EFF is a measure of MFI efficiency, Risk is a measure of MFI risk, and SocPer is a measure of MFI social performance.
We drop subscripts i and t for simplicity.
Regression (1) analyses the multivariate relationship of the explanatory variables to MFI ratings and constitutes our starting point for the analysis. However, specification (1) implicitly assumes that there are no other effects on MFI ratings than the influence of the test variables.
To control for other possible effects, such as the influence of geographical location or economic conditions, (1) is extended with CONTROL, which is a vector of control variables.
The CONTROL vector consists of both firm controls and context controls. The firm control variables include MFI type, MFI age, and rating agency, whereas the context control variables consist of GDP growth, geographical region, the Human Development Index (HDI) and the year the rating is conducted.
(2) ε β β β β β β β
The third regression adds a proxy for solvency (SOLV):
The analysis is repeated with sub-samples split according to the rating agency. One regression is run for each agency. We are then able to identify possible differences between the agencies.
Data Sample and Variable Definitions
active in microfinance. This study includes performance assessment reports made by the five leading microfinance rating agencies. These agencies are the US-based MicroRate, the Italianbased Microfinanza, the French-based Planet Rating (the only agency studied by GutierrezNieto and Serrano-Cinka 2007) and the two Indian-based agencies Crisil and M-Cril. Even if an agency argues that its methodology is different from that of other agencies (Mitra et al. 2008) , the core information used in this study consists of standard indicators that are calculated alike across the industry. All agencies consider themselves as operating worldwide.
However, the Indian-based agencies are more active in Asia, whereas the others are more We use the log of total assets, LN(ASSETS), as our primary size variable in the regressions.
Profitability is measured through return on assets, ROA, and operating expenses relative to total loan portfolio, OEX_PORTF, form the efficiency measure. Risk is measured as the portfolio at risk > 30, PAR30.
2 The social performance indicator is the average outstanding loan amount adjusted for GDP in the countries where the MFIs are situated, AVG_LOAN_PPP. These listed explanatory variables are the same as those used in GutierrezNieto and Serrano-Cinka (2007). We add the debt to equity ratio, DEBT/EQUITY, as our measure of solvency. We will refer to this main regression specification as Model 1: The MFIs have operating expenses equal to 27.7% of their total loan portfolio average, illustrating the high cost associated with small loans. The mean for portfolio at risk is 5.83%
of the gross loan portfolio. The average GDP-adjusted loan size is 1.137 USD, and the mean debt-to-equity ratio is relatively high at 6.82.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Empirical Analysis
We begin our analysis of the factors explaining MFI ratings by evaluating the ratings' pairwise correlation coefficients using the explanatory variables. This analysis is comparable to the bivariate analyses of Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinka (2007). Table 3 ). Thus, we use a multivariate setting to analyse these statistical associations via regression analysis, as outlined in Section 2. Table 4 reports the findings.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] Several alternative variables could have been chosen to proxy for size, profitability, efficiency, risk, social performance, and solvency. We have tested the robustness of our conclusions by investigating the influence of alternative proxies on the regression results. Table 5 reports the results. In our first alternative regression specification, the log of the loan portfolio (LN(PORTF)) is used as the size proxy. The adjusted return on assets (AROA) 6 is the profitability proxy, whereas operating expenses divided by total assets (OEX_ASSETS) is the measure for efficiency. Risk is measured through portfolio write-offs (WROFF), and we use average loan size without adjusting for GDP to proxy for social performance (AVG_LOAN).
Finally, current assets divided by short-term liabilities (CA/SHD) replace the debt-to-equity ratio as our proxy for solvency. CA/SHD is a more short-term solvency indicator than 5 The regressions provide very similar results when lagged values of the explanatory variables are used to replace the current values because the explanatory variables are substantially auto-correlated. The correlations between the current and lagged values vary from 0.55 (PAR30) to 0.97 (LN_ASSETS). 6 Because subsidies are common in microfinance, AROA can be used as a subsidy-adjusted indicator; it is calculated by rating agencies and often used as an alternative to the standard ROA measure.
specification is referred to as Model 2: Because CA/SHD is a relatively short-term solvency measure, it can also be viewed as a proxy for short-term risk and may thus capture the same information content as our risk proxies. The correlation coefficient of CA/SHD and PAR30 is 0.02, and that of CA/SHD and WROFF is 0.14. Hence, the information content of CA/SHD appears to be different from that of our risk proxies. 8 OSS is an indicator that shows whether the MFI covers its finance, operating and loan loss costs using its operating income. 9 The risk coverage ratio measures the share of the loans that are 30 days past due that is covered by the default provisions in the MFI's financial statements.
Once again, the results of the main analysis indicating that efficiency and solvency are related to MFI ratings seem questionable. The two proxy variables are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the relation between efficiency, solvency, and ratings is weak. On the other hand, the results for social performance are very robust; all proxies of social performance, including female client targeting, appear to be (totally) unrelated to ratings. It should also be noted, however, that in the two latter regressions, missing observations for some of the alternative proxies leads to a drop in the total number of observations. Numerous combinations of the variables in models 1-3 would have been possible as part of the regression analysis. In fact, even more proxy variables could have been studied. Thus, we have conducted one additional, comprehensive robustness check. In this untabulated analysis, we replace the proxy variables of Model 1 with relevant alternatives one at a time. The analysis strengthens the previously stated conclusions; size and profitability appear to be significantly positively associated with MFI ratings, whereas risk appears to be significantly negatively associated with ratings. No statistical relation is observed between the ratings and the social performance measures. The analysis confirms that the findings from the previous regression analyses regarding the relationship between ratings and efficiency and between ratings and solvency are weak and sensitive to the proxy variables chosen. Our conclusions regarding efficiency and solvency are actually sensitive not only to the proxy variables selected for these explanatory variables but also to the proxy variables selected for the other explanatory variables. The results regarding efficiency illustrate the importance of analysing the explanatory variables in a multivariate setting; in correlation analyses and other bivariate analyses (compare Table 3 in this study and that of Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinka 2007), efficiency proxies tend to be significantly related to ratings. However, in more advanced multivariate analyses, the strength of this statistical relationship can very much be questioned.
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The findings indicating that the drivers of ratings are size, profitability, and risk demonstrate that MFI ratings may not be very different from traditional credit ratings. If this is the case, why call them something different? For instance, in the classic study by Pogue and Soldofsky (1969) , in which the authors construct a prediction model for new credit ratings, the explanatory variables were the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, the ratio of net income to total assets, the coefficient of variation in earnings, total assets, and the amount of interest over the change in interest. In another classic study (Horrigan 1966) , pure financial ratios such as working capital to total sales, net worth to total debt, and sales to net worth were the explanatory variables used. A recent study by Altman and Sabato (2007) confirms the importance of financial indicators to credit ratings; EBITDA, total interest expense, shortterm debt, and book equity are the most important explanatory variables in their model.
Hence, it appears that the drivers of performance assessment ratings for MFIs are very similar to the drivers of traditional ratings. 10 We now conduct an agency-specific analysis to study possible differences in rating methodologies, which are reported to be important in Hartarska (2009) and Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008) . Model 1 is run using the following sub-samples: MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, and M-Cril. 11 We do not report separate results for Crisil because the number of observations available for this agency is low.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
19 Table 6 shows that size is significantly positively related to MFI ratings for all agencies and that risk is significantly negatively related to ratings. The relation between profitability and ratings is positive for all agencies and significant for Planet and Microfinanca. Social performance has a very insignificant coefficient for all agencies. Two particularly interesting results emerge when efficiency and solvency are analysed. In the main analysis in Table 4 , efficiency was significantly positively related to ratings. This was also the case when solvency was considered. Table 6 suggests that the results for efficiency are driven by Planet.
The regression coefficient is significant for this agency but not for any of the other agencies.
In fact, OEX_PORTF shows surprisingly low t-values for all agencies but Planet. If the analysis is repeated using a pooled sample without the Planet observations, the t-value of
OEX_PORTF is only -0.43 and is not at all significant (not tabulated). Hence, it appears that
Planet is the only agency that attaches any weight to efficiency in determining ratings.
Comparable results are reported for solvency. Microrate is the only agency with a significant coefficient. Thus, the main results indicating that solvency is positively related to MFI ratings appear to be solely driven by the Microrate ratings. A regression without the Microrate observations confirms this; the t-value for solvency becomes only -1.17 (not tabulated).
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The explanatory power of the agency-specific regressions varies from 46.76% to 70.87%.
These levels are comparable to those of classic studies of credit ratings. For instance, Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) reported an explanatory power of 71%, whereas Horrigan (1966) was able to correctly predict just over one half of the samples of bond ratings. Thus, our models appear to be well specified, capturing much of the information relevant in computing MFI ratings.
The weighted average of the adjusted R 2 is 62.02%. This is higher than the adjusted R 2 12 The results regarding efficiency and solvency were somewhat sensitive to the influence of outliers in the overall sample. If a robust regression is used with the Planet sample, the t-value of OEX_PORTF actually increases. Similarily, an increase in the t-value of DEBT/EQUITY is observed if a robust regression is used with the Microrate sample. Thus, the agency-specific results for efficiency and solvency do not appear to be driven by outliers.
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indicated by the pooled regression (which was equal to 54.19%). This finding suggests that the rating methodology is not constant across agencies; agency-specific differences cause agency-specific regressions to perform better than pooled regressions. An analysis of the regression coefficients yields a similar conclusion; most explanatory variables are standardised, and their coefficients may thus be compared across the regressions. An analysis of the coefficient of the risk proxy PAR30 is particularly instructive in this regard. All agencyspecific regressions show significant coefficients for this variable. However, the size of the coefficient varies substantially from one agency to the next. In the M-CRIL sample, the regression coefficient for PAR30 is -1.56, whereas it is only -0.20 when the Planet sample is used. Having noted that the t-value also is much higher in the M-CRIL sample than in the Planet sample, one might conclude that M-CRIL seems to attach far more weight to risk than does Planet. On the other hand, M-CRIL seems to put less emphasis on profitability than do the other agencies.
Based on the assumption that ratings may be dependant on older information rather than just on the current values of the explanatory variables, all regressions in Table 6 are re-run using explanatory variables that are lagged one year (not tabulated). Although the significance level of some of the variables is slightly lower than indicated in Table 6 , none of the conclusions are affected. If the average of the current observations and the lagged values is instead employed for all explanatory variables, the results become identical to the ones reported in Table 6 . However, in this latter specification, the adjusted R 2 increases slightly in the Planet sample (from 70.87% to 74.58%). In the other sub-samples, this change decreases the adjusted R 2 . Although the levels of explanatory power of the various specifications cannot be directly compared (because there are slightly fewer observations when lagged values are 21 used), these results does provide some indication that Planet attaches more weight to historical information than do the other agencies.
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Overall, our empirical results can be summarised as follows: MFI size and profitability affect performance assessment ratings positively, whereas the influence of risk is negative. Social performance is consistently unrelated to ratings. In general, neither efficiency nor solvency seems to be related to ratings. However, there is evidence of a positive influence of efficiency on the ratings in the Planet sample and of a positive influence of solvency on those in the Microrate sample.
Concluding Remarks
This study presents a comprehensive multivariate analysis of the relation between MFI ratings, performance assessment ratings or global risk assessments, and MFI size, profitability, efficiency, risk, social performance, and solvency. Several proxies for the explanatory variables are examined, and a large number of regressions are run. The findings of this study indicating that MFI size and profitability are positively related to MFI rankings and that risk is negatively related to ratings are as expected. However, the finding indicating that efficiency seems to be totally unrelated to MFI ratings for all agencies but one is surprising. Many may find it objectionable that a rating that is supposed to measure how well MFIs are functioning (i.e., the degree to which they fulfil their objectives) does not reflect MFI operational efficiency. This criticism is strengthened by the fact that a lack of efficiency is often considered a major challenge for MFIs (see, e.g., Sinha 2002; Fitch 2008) . One 22 consequence of excluding efficiency from ratings may be that MFIs do not improve efficiency levels because a high degree of efficiency is not required for them to receive a good rating.
A typical MFI has multiple bottom-line objectives and is expected to deliver both financial and social results. If these ratings are supposed to be comprehensive in the sense that they reflect firms' ability to achieve all objectives, then performance assessment ratings should also be a function of social performance indicators. However, we are unable to discover any statistical relationship between a number of social performance indicators and ratings. This conclusion holds for all rating agencies studied. Prior research (Gutierrez-Nieto and SerranoCinka 2007) has also failed to identify such a relationship. Thus, performance assessment ratings seem not to live up to the Rating Fund's definition of ratings as "an opinion of the ability to deliver according to objectives."
Because microfinance ratings do not consider operational efficiency or social performance, they are very similar to traditional credit ratings. It thus seems timely for donors to ask whether subsidising specialised microfinance rating agencies makes sense. In the long term, it is probably better for MFIs to be mainstreamed into traditional rating agencies, at least as long as the specialised agencies do not provide additional value. Moreover, because the specialised agencies (all except for Microrate) do not consider solvency risk, traditional credit raters are probably better able to provide true risk ratings for MFIs. Alternatively, if specialised rating agencies are to prove that they serve an important function, they must develop a methodology that allows them to evaluate MFIs' overall ability to reach their goals and handle resources efficiently. In general, ratings may have fostered a higher degree of transparency in the microfinance industry, but the quality of the ratings is very much debatable and deserves more 23 attention by industry stakeholders and researchers. It will be particularly important to determine whether MFI managers use rating information to improve operations. 
MFI Characteristic Hypothesis
Size MFI size is positively related to the rating assigned.
Profitability MFI profitability is positively related to the rating assigned.
Efficiency MFI efficiency is positively related to the rating assigned.
Risk MFI risk is negatively related to the rating assigned.
Social performance There is no relationship between the MFI's social performance and the rating assigned. Solvency MFI solvency is positively related to the rating assigned. Table 3 presents Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients below (above) the diagonal for MFI rating (RATE), size (LN(ASSETS)), profitability (ROA), efficiency (OEX_PORTF), risk (PAR30), social performance (AVG_LOAN_PPP), and solvency (DEBT/EQUITY). All variables are defined in Table 2 . Boldface denotes significance at a 5 % level with two-sided tests. The test variables are defined in Table 2 . CONTROL is a vector of control variables: GDP_GR, HDI, AGE_MFI, Year, Region, Type and Agency. GDP_GR is GDP growth, HDI is the human development index, AGE_MFI is the number of years since the institution began conducting microfinance activities, Year is a set of indicator variables for each year of observations (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , Region is a set of indicator variables for the MFIs' geographical locations (LA, Africa, MENA, EECA, and Asia), Type is a set of indicator variables for MFI type (bank, non-bank financial institution, NGO, cooperative/credit union, state bank, and other), and Agency is a set of indicator variables for the rating agencies (Microrate, Planet, Microfinanza, CRISIL, and M-CRIL). The table reports regression coefficients, t-values, explanatory power (Adj. R 
LN(PORTF)
is the log of the total loan portfolio, AROA is the adjusted return on assets, OEX_ASSETS is operating expenses divided by total assets, WROFF is total write-offs, AVG_LOAN is average loan size, CA/SHD is current assets divided by short-term liabilities, LN(CLIENTS) is the log of total clients, OSS is operational selfsustainability, PERS_PROD is the number of loan clients divided by the number of employees, RISK_COV is the risk coverage ratio, WOM_PERC is the percentage of female customers, and PORTF/ASSETS is the loan portfolio divided by assets. CONTROL is defined in Table 4 . The table reports the regression coefficients, tvalues, explanatory power (Adj. R 2 ) and number of observations (No. obs). Boldface denotes significance at a 5 % level with two-sided tests. 
